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Abstract 
This paper draws on ideas in economics and game theory to develop a 
new theory of marketing and corporate communication in the emerging 
network economy. We argue that in a network economy, firms and 
consumers will confront “coordination problems.” With the emerging 
network economy all this become urgent because the availability and cost 
of information decreases. Also, timing issues becomes crucial as millions 
of people get access to the same information simultaneously. That explain 
why events where masses of viewers simultaneously participate in the 
same events become so important. We introduce a simple game theoretic 
model to explain this, and discuss marketing applications and possible 
strategies.  
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I. Introduction: the Argument 
This paper draws on some fundamental ideas in economics and game theory  
(Hayek 1937;  Geneakoplos 1992;  Foss 2001; Chwe 2001) to develop a new theory of 
the marketing function in the emerging network economy.  As we have increasingly 
come to realize, networks have their own logics (Varian and Shapiro 1999; Kelly 
1999).  In particular, network externalities and critical mass are crucial aspects of the 
network economy  aspects that corporate communication needs to take into 
account.   We shall argue that this implies that in a network economy, firms and 
consumers increasingly will confront what economists and game theorists call 
“coordination problems”: The network may possess a number of potential equilibria 
in the strategies (consumption choices and marketing strategies) of consumers and 
firms  but these equilibria are not equally good from the point of view of 
consumers and firms.  However, unassisted they cannot (always) choose the 
preferred equilibrium.   
In this situation, the ability to influence and take the lead and influence the 
beliefs of consumers is crucial, because beliefs underlie the choices of consumers 
and firms.  The role of marketing in a network economy, which is rich in potential 
coordination problems, is then to mould beliefs in such a way that the optimal 
consumption and sales/marketing strategies are realized  to the benefit of firms 
as well as consumers.  
  In particular, the ability to create so-called “common knowledge” 
conditions  that is, knowledge conditions in which “A knows that B knows that A 
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knows … etc. that X is the case”   becomes crucial.  We discuss various ways in 
which the marketing function may bring about such belief conditions.  Our 
argument represents a new way of understanding the fundamental mechanisms 
behind, for example, advertising, notably in a networked economy that is rich in 
connected goods, the use of which needs to be coordinated.  
 
II. An Example 
To illustrate our reasoning, consider the example of Super Bowl advertising (Chwe 
2001).  The Super Bowl is the most popular program on American network 
television that occurs regularly.  It is likely to be seen by a majority of American 
households.  In fact, any American household is likely to know that a majority of 
other households have seen it.  The kind of products that are typically advertised on 
the Super Bowl transmission are products such as the Macintosh, the Discover card, 
Chrysler’s Neon automobile and various Nike and Reebok athletic shoes.   Is there 
something in common between these products?   
 Consider the case of the Macintosh.  Imagine that you are back in 1984.  Is 
there any special problem associated with buying a Macintosh? The answer is, of 
course, that when you consider buying a Macintosh, you want as many others to 
buy a Mac as possible.  The reason?  You want to be able to exchange programs, 
documents, games, etc.  This is what economists call a “network externality.”  Your 
problem is that you don’t know whether a sufficient number of other buyers will in 
fact buy a Mac, that is, you don’t know whether there will be “critical mass.”  Enter 
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the Super Bowl transmission.  As a potential Mac buyer, at least this will make you 
know that other potential Mac buyers have seen the Mac ad.  In fact, this goes for 
any potential Mac buyer who has seen the Super Bowl transmission.  In other 
words, “common knowledge” is established.  Before we discuss the generalisability 
of this example, we will take a look at what is going here analytically.  
 
 
III. Analytical Perspective 
The fundamental assumption of this paper is that the moulding of consumer beliefs 
will become important because firms and consumers in a network economy to a 
growing extent will face what coordination problems.  To understand what a 
coordination problem is about, consider Figure 1. 
Figure 1: A coordination problem in consumption choice 
 
                                                                                Consumer B 
                         Choose Mac       Choose PC 
     
     
      Choose Mac         100, 100                 0, 0 
    
 Consumer A  
                                                                         0, 0                     100, 100 
      Choose PC 
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The 2x2 matrix in Figure 1 maps a “coordination game” in consumption choice.  It 
involves two “players,” A(rthur) and B(rian), who both have two available 
“strategies,” namely to buy either a Mac or a PC.  They choose and exercise one of 
these strategies not knowing which strategy the other player will choose and 
exercise (they are not allowed to communicate). Their behaviours (i.e., their choice 
and execution of certain strategies) are interdependent, resulting in the “pay-offs” 
that are shown in the matrix. This because both prefer that they use the same kind 
of computer, as this makes them able to exchange software, etc. The matrix shows 
that it doesn’t matter whether both choose PCs or Macs, as long as they make the 
choice.  Solutions to such a problem occur, when each player makes his/her best 
choice, regardless of what the other player does. This is called a “Nash-
equilibrium.”  There are thus two (symmetric) (Nash) “equilibria” in this game, that 
is, situations where neither Arthur nor Brian has an incentive to change their 
behaviour, given what the other player does, namely where they both choose Macs 
nor both choose PCs.  If they don’t succeed in coordinating on an equilibrium, they 
will realize zero utilities, for example, because they are unable to exchange 
programs.  They wish to avoid this situation.  
Now, can they avoid it, particularly if instead of thinking of two players, we 
think of thousands of players who need to coordinate their consumption decisions?   
The problem is of course that given the way that the situation has been designed 
any agent has no particular rational reason to believe that any other player will 
make a particular choice; he may just as well choose a Mac as a PC.  Of course, you 
may flip a coin to assist your choice, but that is potentially risky/costly.  It would be 
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better if you knew what the other players (or a majority) were going to choose.   In 
fact, it would be better if they knew that you knew what they chose. It would be 
even better if you knew that they knew that you knew what they chose, etc.  in 
other words, if common knowledge about consumption choices obtain.   This would 
result in the belief conditions where all consumers could make an unambiguous 
best consumption choice. 
 Goods for which it is best for all consumers if common knowledge conditions 
prevail, are called “coordination goods” by Chwe (2001).  Goods may possess this 
quality for various reasons.  In some cases, users are really only interested in 
connectivity and a large network for purely technical reasons.  In other cases, such 
as those of Nike or Reebok athletic shoes, such technical complementarity has very 
little to do with consumers’ purchasing decisions.  Rather, they purchase such 
goods because they are interested in having others form certain beliefs about them, 
for example, that they, too, are members of a certain in-group. Also, the purchasing 
decision may be purely a matter of snobbism.  However, in all these cases, 
consumers face a coordination problem.  And in all of these cases, establishing 
common knowledge may be key to having the consumers solve their coordination 
problems  and to firms having success.   Some firms, if certainly not all, are 
acutely aware of this. A striking example was an increasingly squeezed 
WordPerfect filing a court complaint against Microsoft to make the court stop the 
Microsoft claim that Word was the globally most popular software for word-
processing purposes.  Another example is Netscape’s Navigator campaign, which 
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revolved around slogan, “Netscape Everywhere.”  In the following section, we 
briefly discuss some implications for marketing.  
 
IV.  Implications for Corporate Communication 
The Nobel winning Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek (1945) emphasized the 
capacity of markets to quickly and efficiently spread and coordinate knowledge, 
talking more than metaphorically about the “telecommunications systems of the 
market.”  In marketing, the emphasis has often been on coordination in a vertical 
marketing system or a value chain (as in Alderson 1957).  It is well known that for 
such systems or chains to function well, the flow of products or services and 
knowledge needs coordination.  Our perspective here is different, although we 
share Hayek’s concern with the coordination of knowledge, since we focus on the 
individual consumer coordinating his consumption in view of what other 
consumers do rather than on coordination in vertical value chains.  
 In the ”old economy,” interdependencies between consumers’ choices were 
known as ”band wagon-”, ”snob-” and ”Veblen effects.”  Thus, a concern with the 
implications of social buying motives is not new per se.   In the older literature, both 
the price signal and the number of other consumers were important issues.  
However, in an increasingly networked and information-based economy, all this 
becomes even more important because more and more products and services are 
linked, giving rise to coordination problems and network externalitites.   The 
counterpart to this is that information has become increasingly available, at a 
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generally lower price.  In turn, this means that the timing issue becomes urgent as 
millions of people can easily get access to the same information simultaneously.   
 While establishing common knowledge was earlier a matter of direct eye 
contact, participation in rituals, etc.  (see Chwe 2000), increasingly mass 
communication can facilitate  common knowledge conditions on a large scale.  This 
explains where masses of viewers simultaneously eye in on the same events become 
so important as means of coordinating interdependent (consumption) choices.   
 As coordination goods become increasingly common, coordination becomes 
increasingly needed, and the means of achieving coordination through mass 
communication become available at lower cost, the latter becomes a competitive 
frontier.  If Apple was perhaps the first company to ”see” or just accidentally use 
this opportunity for the first time in 1984, there is nothing coincidental about taking 
advantage of mass scale events any more.  Coordination goods are traded on global 
mass markets.  In the face of missing common knowledge, the risk of purchasing a 
particular good or solution may seem too big and the consumer may refrain from 
that purchase.  
 Therefore, any marketer dealing with such goods need to address the issue. 
The tools that are available fall into several groups.  We discuss these in the 
following. 
  Pre-market signalling can in various ways be a useful tool.  In general, all 
communication means can be used in order to communicate a future market launch 
(Heil and Robertson 1991). Using a social network approach Workman (1998) 
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argues that informal verbal communication can influence the experts, opinion 
leaders and the retailers that a particular standard or solution will become a winner.  
In the last 2 years “virus marketing” has emerged in the form of chains of e-mails 
(Beckmann 2000).  When using the “cc: function” (or an equivalent copy function) of 
e-mails in pre-market signalling of the Sony MiniDisc in 2000, the company was 
able to convince a large number of potential customers to sign up for a game that 
made them aware that a number of their friends also had the knowledge, that they 
were aware of their knowledge about the product and the narratives around it.  The 
result was common knowledge in the “teenager market” that “the others” were 
buying this product and in order to be “in-group”, this was the product to buy.  
Later, the same strategy has been used for a Newsletter where potential customers 
are asked to sign up for a prize contest and simultaneously asked to make up a 
“winning team”, providing the e-mail addresses of the team. The next person is 
made aware of who sent the previous mail as well as asked to repeat the sequence. 
In most cases such strategies are used in order to reach critical size mass with the 
support of first mover advantages.  
 Corporate branding is intended to serve as an umbrella for several products 
brands and product lines in such a way that the values and reputation of the 
company are clearly signaled. While recognition and image are vital issues in all 
branding (Keller 1993), the communication need not be explicit in the same way as 
in pre-market signalling. The recognition of name, symbol, visual design etc. may be 
sufficient communication in order to invoke sufficient “implicit messages” 
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(Underwood and Bright 1996) that trigger the associations connecting the brand 
with a particular standard.  
 The staging of events, rituals and shows are other possible strategies for bringing 
about common knowledge conditions, particularly when situations are staged that 
attract the attention of large numbers of consumers.  The size needed is relative to 
the target group, yet as the “super bowl” example above shows, this can be very 
large indeed.  In other situations, the target group is limited to devotees in a 
particular field. Many companies just take advantage of existing events. That can be 
an explanation for premium priced advertising slots in the coverage of these events. 
Such communication mainly draws on the consumer's limited awareness, implicit 
perception and emotional reactions rather that deliberation.  
 If our arguments hold, we have in effect developed a case against the view that 
“mass marketing” is obsolete and will be replaced by “markets of one.”  The 
common knowledge argument contradicts this for many products.  The mass 
market is the core of these co-ordination problems as they occur in the network 
economy. Domesticated markets may also prevail alongside, but will more likely 
found backwards in the value systems. Companies like Dell, who may be said to 
provide products with some network externalities (like signalling membership of an 
in-group, rather than technically), may be able to ride on both horses.  They can use 
mass advertising in order to provide signalling to prospective customers and yet, 
when they become customers, customize the product for each individual customer.  
So, the future of markets and marketing may reveal more forms that could co-exist.  
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For instance, business models that use the Internet may be designed to preserve 
some individual adaptations and still function as if it is a mass market.  
 There seems to be a need for further research into the goods and services of 
the new network economy.  In the “old economy”, terms such as “bandwagon- “, 
“snob-” and “Veblen-effect” prevailed, and it seems in due time that in particular 
those concepts should be reconsidered in the light of the “new economy” to the 
extent that this emplies and increasingly networked and information-intensive 
economy.  Terms such as “co-ordination goods,” “social brands,” etc. may not be 
precise enough and further conceptual scrutiny should give better insights into the 
categorization of goods in such terms.  To us, it seems likely that the focus on 
several senses and both cognitive and emotional communication should be 
combined. Such mechanisms as the “mere exposure effect” (Zajonc 1980) and the 
creation of “positive affect by small rewards” (Isen 1987) seem to be mechanisms 
that can explain current practice. They explain to a large degree why branding 
works through recognition of names, designs, symbols etc. and should therefore be 
able to explain how common knowledge can occur on large scale global markets. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper is based on a general argument that revolves around the (possible) need 
to establish common knowledge conditions under certain conditions  known as 
“coordination problems”  that may arise when consumption choices are 
interdependent.  We submit that that these game-theoretically ideas are highly 
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pertinent for, and able to a number of marketing challenges, in the network 
economy.  While it may seem easy to categorize goods according to their typical 
purchase- and consumption criteria, for many, and perhaps increasingly many, 
goods more complex issues are at stake because of the involved due to the 
knowledge issues. Some products and brand will fail despite their intrinsic qualities 
because the competitors take advantage of first mover advantages and reach critical 
market size using multiple strategies. One lesson to learn from this is that it is 
important to understand the social and cultural mechanisms at work that create the 
patterns involved with common knowledge and the finer details of deviation from 
its absolute state. Further research will show which psychological mechanisms that 
best support common knowledge. The marketing discipline does not yet provide 
the adequate tools for understanding the marketing function in the emerging 
network economy and  how it may cope with the specific problems that are 
introduced by coordination goods.  We have argued that these tools are likely to 
center on such notions as “common knowledge” and “social brands.” 
 12
VI. References 
Alderson, Wroe (1957). Marketing Behavior and Executive Action. Irwin.  
Bartels, Robert (1976). History of Marketing Thought 2. ed. Columbus Ohio  
Beckmann, Suzanne (2001) Virus marketing, in proceedings of the 30th Annual 
Meeting in The European Academy of Marketing, Bergen, Norway 
Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. (2001) Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common 
Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Foss, Nicolai J. (2001) “Leadership, Beliefs and Coordination,” Industrial and 
Corporate Change 10: 357-388. 
Isen, Alice (1987) Positive affect, cognitive processes and social behavior In L. 
Berkowitz (ed) Advances in Social Psychology 20:  203 - 253 San Diego: Academic 
press 
Geanakoplos, John. (1992) “Common Knowledge,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 6: 
53-82. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. (1945).  “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” in idem. (1948). 
Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.  
Heil, Oliver and Thomas S. Robertson (1991) “Toward a Theory of Competitive 
Market Signaling”, Strategic Management Journal 12: 403-418 
Keller, Kevin Lane (1993) Conceptualizing, Measuring, and managing Customer-
Based Brand Equity Journal of marketing Vol. 57 (January 1993) 1 - 22 
Kelly, Kevin (1999) New Rules for the New Economy. London: Fourth Estate.  
 13
March, James (1985) Bounded rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice 
in Jon Elster (ed) Rational Choice Oxford: Blackwell  
Tapscott, Don (1999) Creating Value in the Network Economy.  Boston: Harvard 
Business School  
Underwood, Geoffrey and James Bright (1996) Cognition with and without awareness 
in Geoffrey Underwood (ed) Implicit Cognition Oxford: Oxford Science 
Publications  
Varian, Hal and Carl Shapiro (1999) Information Rules. Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
Workman, John (1993) “Marketing's Limited role in New Product Development in 
One Computer Systems Firm”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol.  XXX (Nov.) 
405-21 
Zajonc, Robert B. (1980) Feeling and Thinking. Preferences need no inferences. 
American Psychologist 35, pp. 151 - 175 
 
 
 
 
 
 14
